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One-man rule is cited as a common source of regime break-down—what Milan Svolik (2012) refers to as “failures inpower-sharing.” The reason why power-sharing under author-
itarian rule is so hard is self-evident: in the absence of democratic com-
petition there is little to deter incumbent leaders from abusing their
office at the expense of other elites. Against this backdrop, China’s post-
Mao period stands out as an example of relatively effective power-shar-
ing, or what the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) refers to as
“collective leadership.” During this 40-year period, we have observed
between three and six peaceful transitions of power, from one incum-
bent to another. (1)
Rapid concentration of power in President Xi Jinping has raised serious
questions about the efficacy and durability of Chinese power sharing in-
stitutions, leading some observers to conclude that “collective leadership
[in China] is dead.” (2) In this article, I push back on such claims by re-
viewing China’s leadership norms and institutions as well as how they
are being challenged. Building on the work of Slater (2003), I start from
the premise that personalisation and institutionalisation under autocracy
are not a zero-sum game. In the case of China, ambiguous leadership in-
stitutions, coupled with elite complicity, have in fact facilitated Xi’s
power grab. 
Instead, I argue that the dangers of personalisation are more likely to con-
cern future governance challenges. First, departure from collective decision-
making procedures, coupled with increasing censorship, is likely to
discourage critical voices from participating in the political discourse. This
chilling effect will make it harder for the regime to anticipate future chal-
lenges and avoid unnecessary policy blunders. Second, anti-corruption
purges, combined with an apparent desire to seed loyalists, has either dis-
couraged or prevented younger contenders from moving up through the
ranks, effectively thinning out the pipeline of future leaders. This potential
shortage of qualified contenders will affect the Party irrespective of whether
Xi remains in office. 
Chinese elite politics under Xi Jinping
In explaining the CCP’s durability, scholars point to China-specific leader-
ship institutions, norms, and procedures, which in theory facilitate stable
power sharing. In particular, prior research points to: organisational frag-
mentation that prevents incumbents from monopolising power (Lampton
and Lieberthal 1992; Xu 2011), age and term limits that prevent incumbents
from entrenching themselves in office (Ma 2016; Nathan 2003; Shirk 2002;
Manion 1993), along with procedures for collective decision-making that
incorporate lower levels through reciprocal accountability (Shirk 1993; Hu
2014).
Recent consolidation and personalisation of power around Xi Jinping raises
serious questions about each of the above. Over the last five years, Xi has
resurrected the titles of “Core Leader” (Miller 2016), immortalised his ide-
ological “thought” into the CCP constitution (Miller 2017), (3) and revised
the national constitution to remove term limits for the office of the presi-
dency. (4) How did Xi Jinping accumulate such an unprecedented amount of
personal power and what does it mean for the future of elite politics in
China? 
I begin by outlining the boundaries of collective leadership and examine
just how far Xi has pushed them. Like Slater, who examined packing, rigging,
and circumventing of Malaysia’s leadership institutions under Mohamad
Mahathir, I focus on challenges posed by Xi Jinping towards the separation
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1. Hua Guofeng briefly succeeded Mao Zedong before relinquishing control to Deng Xiaoping. Deng
initially designated two successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. After helping bring both down,
Deng fully handed the reigns to Jiang Zemin. Jiang relinquished power to Hu Jintao in 2002, who
then handed it to Xi Jinping in 2012. 
2. For example, see: Jeremy Page and Chun Han Wong. “Xi Jinping Is Alone at the Top and Collective
Leadership ‘Is Dead’,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-
xi-elevated-to-mao-status-1508825969 (accessed on 15 November 2017).
3. The CCP added Deng’s name and thought to the constitution after he died in 1997. 
4. “China’s National Legislature Adopts Constitutional Amendment,” Xinhua, 13 March 2018,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/11/c_137031606.htm (accessed on 15 March 2018). 
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of powers, norms surrounding succession, and procedures for collective de-
cision-making in China. Although each of these features are aimed at con-
straining despotic rule, each is also subordinate to the primary goal of
political domination by the CCP. As such, we should allow for the possibility
that personalisation of power can occur even if a ruling party’s key institu-
tions are still intact (Slater 2003). 
Circumventing the separation of powers
The 17th Party Congress Communique from 2007 defines collective lead-
ership as “a system with a division of responsibilities among individual lead-
ers to prevent arbitrary decision-making by a single top leader.” (5) In stark
contrast, the first PB meeting of the 19th Congress in October 2017 con-
cluded that “centralised and unified leadership by the Party is the highest
principle of the leadership.” Most recently, Xi Jinping’s outgoing anti-cor-
ruption czar, Wang Qishan, penned an essay in People’s Daily outlining
“problems with separating party and state,” and explaining why future chal-
lenges would require doing away with this division. (6)
Anticipating Wang’s thesis, Xi Jinping is actively blurring the divisions between
politics, economics, and military affairs since stepping into office in 2012. This
distortion of boundaries is clearly visible in the number and span of leadership
positions currently held by Xi Jinping, referred to by some as the “chairman of
everything.” (7) By Cheng Li’s (2016) count, Xi now holds a total of 12 top posts
in the country’s most powerful leadership bodies (see Table 1). 
With the exception of the core titles of General Party Secretary, Presi-
dent, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the remaining
positions fall into the category of “leading groups,” which are informal
bodies of extreme power—often having more influence than respective
ministries. The mere presence of so many leading groups seems itself a
contradiction to collective leadership, separation of power, and constitu-
tional authority more broadly. Yet, this is precisely what they are designed
to do, i.e., overcome bureaucratic or organisational barriers, pool resources,
and push through policy agendas (Miller 2008). Whether intended or not,
CCP leaders, beginning with Mao, (8) have routinely taken advantage of the
leading groups to bypass opposition and assert control; Xi Jinping is just
the latest.
What is perhaps different, however, is how Xi’s leading groups cross-cut
and overlap multiple policy arenas, some of which have traditionally fallen
under the purview of other Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members
and State Council ministers. For instance, the vaguely named Central Lead-
ing Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms conceivably oversees
anything from financial markets to environmental regulation. At the same
time, however, Xi has not appropriated portfolios that were not his for the
taking. As Table 1 summarises, seven of Xi’s titles have precedents, insofar
as they were previously held by Hu Jintao, and by Jiang Zemin before him.
The remaining five offices were conjured up during Xi’s first term in office,
and there is nothing in formal or informal party guidelines that discourages
such action. For instance, the National Security Commission gives Xi indirect
control over both foreign and domestic security, without expressly taking
over those portfolios. Similarly, Xi’s most recent title, Commander-in-Chief
of “PLA Joint Operations,” lays claim to new political territory, as there were
no formal “joint operations” under previous administrations.
In other words, rather than overtly breaking down fences, Xi Jinping ap-
pears to be re-drawing the bounds and meaning of institutional power-shar-
ing. To be sure, the point here is not in any way to downplay Xi’s political
bravado, but rather to highlight the nuanced signalling game Xi is playing.
Put differently, if Xi wanted to demonstrate his dominance and the end of
collective leadership, he might simply appropriate the National Energy Com-
mission (headed by Li Keqiang) or the Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection (CCDI, now run by Zhao Leji). He has not done so, at least not yet.
Instead, Xi has circumvented collective leadership through the institution
of informal leading groups, a practice that predates his tenure and collective
leadership more broadly. 
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5. Hu Jintao, 以改革创新精神全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程 (Yi gaige chuangxin jingshen
quanmian tuijin dang de jianshe xin de weida gongcheng, Promoting comprehensive Party building
in the spirit of reform and innovation), 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, 15 October 2007,
cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104098/6379184.html (accessed on 15 November 2017).
6. Wang Qishan, 开启新时代 踏上新征程 (Kaiqi xin shidai ta shang xin zhengcheng, Opening a
new era, stepping out on a new path), People’s Daily, 7 November 2017, paper.people.com.cn/
rmrb/html/2017-11/07/nw.D110000renmrb_20171107_1-02.htm (accessed on 15 November
2017). 
7. For instance, see: Javier Hernandez, “China’s ‘Chairman of Everything’: Behind Xi Jinping’s Many
Titles,” The New York Times, 25 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/asia/china-
xi-jinping-titles-chairman.html (accessed on 15 November 2017). 
8. In 1966, Mao Zedong installed loyalists to the Central Leading Small Group on the Cultural Rev-
olution to oversee a mass youth uprising and a widespread purge of his rivals and CCP elite more
broadly. During his tenure, Jiang Zemin repeatedly refashioned the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group,
at times leaning on generals or diplomats, reflecting changes in his Cross-Straits strategy (Hsiao
2013).
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Table 1 – Leadership Positions Held by Xi Jinping
Leadership body Title Tenure since Precedent
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Gen. Secretary 2012.11 Y
Central Military Commission of the CCP Chair 2012.11 Y
Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs Head 2012.11 Y
Presidency of the People’s Republic of China President 2013.03 Y
Central Military Commission of the PRC Chair 2013.03 Y
Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs, National Security Head 2013.03 Y
Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Work Head 2013.03 Y
PRC National Security Committee Chair 2013.11 new
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Chair 2013.11 new
Central Leading Group for Network Security and Information Techology Head 2014.02 new
Leading Group for Deepening Reform of National Defense and Military Head 2014.02 new
PLA Joint Operations Command Center Cmdr. in Chief 2016.04 new
Note: Based on Li (2016) and expanded upon records from China Vitae Research Library.
Even if there is still some separation of power at the very top, Xi is dra-
matically reshaping the way power is organised just below. These effects
are most vivid within the military. Though often seen as an arm of the CCP,
the PLA has traditionally enjoyed a measure of autonomy from the political
state, at times acting in violation of or even contradiction to the aims of
the leadership (Cheung 2001). Since Xi took office, however, thousands of
military personnel, including hundreds of senior officers, have been purged
and the traditional system of regional command, a vestige of the PLA’s land-
based limitations, has been scrapped and replaced with five theatres under
the direct oversight of the Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by
Xi. (9) The CMC itself was downsized from 11 members to seven, (10) and in
December 2017, the CCP Central Committee (CCOM) announced that the
People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), a force of more than 600,000 overseen
by both the State Council and the CMC since 1982, would be put under the
direct command of the CMC alone, beginning on 1 January 2018. 
Consolidation within China’s cabinet mirrors that of the military. As of
March 2017, the State Council, chaired by Premier Li Keqiang, has been re-
duced from 35 members to 27. As in the case of the military, the merger of
prominent ministries and the creation of new agencies and administrations
is being touted on grounds of modernisation and efficiency. (11) This claim is
not unwarranted. For instance, the recently proposed Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, a State Immigration Administration, and an Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency each address policy arenas that
have only really emerged over the last decade.
At the same time, and just as in the case of military restructuring, it is
hard to ignore how changes within the governing cabinet are blurring the
boundary between state and party. The Financial Stability and Development
Committee (announced in November 2017), for instance, combines eco-
nomic oversight with policymaking powers, each of which has traditionally
been housed in separate kitchens (Naughton 2017). (12) Even more dramat-
ically, a new National Supervision Commission (NSC) merges and absorbs
the functions of the Ministry of Supervision (a state institution) within that
of the CCDI (a party organ). (13) This new branch of government not only ce-
ments Xi Jinping’s signature anti-corruption crusade as permanent fixture
of the party-state, its institutional rank—equal to that of the State Council
and higher than the judicial organs—circumvents the most paramount di-
vision of power and rule of law. (14)
Rigging the transfer of power
The transfer of power in Chinese leadership politics has been guided in re-
cent decades by three reinforcing norms, none of which are formally or
legally outlined in the CCP’s or the PRC’s constitution (Wang and Vangeli
2016). The first, and arguably the most important, concerns age and term
limits. The second and third are about the nomination and the grooming of
future leaders, respectively. Below, I briefly review the origins of these suc-
cession norms and the degree to which they are being followed today. 
One of Deng Xiaoping’s pivotal reform efforts was rejuvenating the CCP
ranks by persuading revolutionary leaders into retirement (Manion 1993).
Although Deng refrained from adopting a specific age threshold for top
leaders, age restrictions for provincial and ministerial-level leadership posi-
tions, along with fixed term limits, were adopted into the constitution. These
efforts gradually culminated into norms for retirement, with lower-level
leaders facing mandatory retirement at 60 and mid-level leaders in the Cen-
tral Committee at 65 (Nathan 2003). The norm for top leaders is not in-
scribed in any rule book, but precedent suggests that incumbents may con-
tinue to serve when they are still 67, but not if they have reached 68, a
practice widely known as the “seven-up, eight-down (qi shang, ba xia)”
rule. (15) In practice, this norm, combined with the age demographics of
upper-most leadership cohorts, has also constrained top leaders to two
terms in office, which happens to coincide with the state positions. 
Rather than violating the age-based retirement norm, Xi is taking full ad-
vantage of it. Although many expected 69-year-old Wang Qishan, a key Xi
ally and principal agent of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, to stay in the
PBSC, he officially retired from his party portfolio during the 19th Party
Congress. (16) This, of course, did not prevent Wang from taking over the vice-
presidency, a position that carries no age restriction. Furthermore, all 16
members from the 18th PBSC who had passed the age threshold were re-
tired, freeing up slots for Xi loyalists, including the elevation of 67-year-old
Li Zhanshu to the PBSC. 
Another, more ambiguous, set of norms concerns the selection and
grooming of successors, a perennial source of friction and uncertainty in
non-democratically constituted regimes. The CCP is thought to have made
in-roads into this problem by extending the succession process across over-
lapping generations, whereby leaders-in-waiting take on key roles within
the PBSC in advance of their expected promotion (Ma 2016). This staggered
approach has two important implications. First, it means that future leaders
are well-socialised into the leadership structure before taking formal posi-
tions. Second, it implies that although incumbents are constrained from di-
rectly naming their own successors they have considerable influence in
nominating contenders to succeed one generation later. 
Importantly, therefore, adherence to the “seven-up, eight down” age norm
implies that all members of the 19th PBSC, including Xi, are too old to carry
on the mantle of General Party Secretary after 2022. (17) Xi’s predicament
aside, the key takeaway of the 19th Party Congress was thus the curious
absence of any leader-in-waiting. A surprise constitutional overhaul, con-
ducted behind the scenes of the 2018 national legislative session, helped
clear things up by removing term limits for the office of President (also held
by Xi Jinping). As with the vice-presidency, the presidency carries no age re-
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9. “China’s Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, 1 February 2016, www.xin-
huanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).
10. Charlotte Gao, “Has Xi Fully Consolidated His Power Over the Military?” The Diplomat, 8 January
2018, thediplomat.com/2018/01/has-xi-fully-consolidated-his-power-over-the-military/ (ac-
cessed on 15 January 2018). 
11. Government Overhaul Plan, mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_mG6KoJHKvXPpE6YE3zh9w (accessed on 15
March 2018). 
12. “China Establishes Financial Stability and Development Committee,” Xinhua, 8 November 2017,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/08/c_136737949.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017). 
13. There is no question as to the CCP’s predominance within the NSC. At the national level 14 out
of the 17 leadership members come with affiliations to either the Central or provincial Disciplinary
Inspection Commissions (DIC). At the provincial level more than 170 of the roughly 300 provincial
committee members have ties to provincial DICs. Author’s calculations based on provincial reports. 
14. See: Charlotte Gao, “China Plans to Amend Its Constitution,” The Diplomat, 28 December 2017,
thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-plans-to-amend-its-constitution/ (accessed on 18 January
2018). 
15. Wang and Vangeli (2016) refer to this as the “Li Ruihuan Clause” because it was the uncomfortable
task of retiring Li Ruihuan in 1997—then 68 years old—that encouraged members of the 15th
Congress, with strong pressure from Jiang Zemin, to lower the formal retirement age of top leaders
from 70 to 68.
16. See: Wang Xiangwei, “Despite Retirement, Xi’s Right-Hand Man Wang Qishan is Still Within Arm’s
Reach,” South China Morning Post, 2 December 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/arti-
cle/2122250/despite-retirement-xis-right-hand-man-wang-qishan-still-within (accessed on 15
December 2017). 
17. Zhao Leji, the youngest member, will be 65 in 2022 and can look forward to no longer than one
more term in the PBSC, which ought to disqualify him from the top spot. 
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striction, meaning that Xi Jinping can comfortably and legally retain his po-
sition as head of state after 2022. A future accommodation for Xi to hold
concurrent control of the Party’s General Secretary position beyond 2022,
despite his advanced age, will thus be easily defendable. 
Packing the balance of power
In addition to institutional divisions and succession norms, many point to
the role of factional politics as providing a de facto balance of power (Cai
and Treisman 2006). Factions revolve around CCP leaders, who play the role
of patrons, leveraging their position of power to cultivate personal networks
of clients (Nathan 1973). Importantly, CCP norms around the transfer of
power facilitate factional competition by creating room for more than one
patron at a time; namely, the incumbent leader and the predecessor. That
is, by preventing incumbents from hand-picking their own successor but al-
lowing them to appoint prospective leaders who might one day succeed
their successor, CCP norms extend the shadow of the incumbent at least
two generations ahead. In theory, this iterative process ought to ensure
some balance of personal power within the top echelon of leaders (Ma
2016). Ironically, although Hu Chunhua is highly unlikely to be promoted in
the future, his presence as one of only three PB members young enough to
be named General Secretary in 2022 is at least a symbolic nod to the idea
of staggered succession, insofar as he is widely seen as having been Hu Jin-
tao’s nominee from 2012.
The present PBSC features representatives from each of China’s most
powerful factions. Premier Li Keqiang and Vice Premier Wang Yang both
hail from the Chinese Communist Youth League and are seen as having
ties to former General Secretary Hu Jintao’s “League faction” (Tuanpai
团派). Han Zheng is most closely associated with former General Secre-
tary Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai clique,” while Zhao Leji and Li Zhanshu are
both seen as part of Xi’s emerging “New Zhijiang army.” The seventh
member, Wang Hu-ning, is a low-profile academic who has connections
with each of the above groupings, having helped pen Jiang’s “Three Rep-
resents,” Hu’s “Scientific Development,” and Xi’s “Socialist Evolution”
theories, each of which is now enshrined in the CCP constitution. 
Although the PBSC appears roughly balanced, as already noted, ac-
cording to the “seven up, eight down” rule, practically the entire current
PBSC will have to retire in 2022. The fulcrum of balance is therefore
more likely to be found in the enlarged PB, which is heavily stacked in
Xi’s favour. Among the 18 current PB members who are not in the stand-
ing committee, only three could convincingly be described as members
of either Hu’s or Jiang’s respective cliques, compared to nine who could
be labelled as part of Team Xi (see Table 2). (18) Such groupings are prob-
lematic, both conceptually and analytically. Specifically, identifying a
factional affiliation often boils down to determining a person’s ex-
pressed or perceived loyalty towards a patron (Shih 2008). The problem,
of course, is deciding whether those expressing loyalty to an incumbent
leader are genuine clients, since not demonstrating such allegiance is
not much of an option.
Which individuals made it into the PB is also only half the story. The
recent career jolts to three leaders tied to Hu Jintao is a case in point.
Sun Zhengcai’s removal just before the 19th Congress—at only 54 years
old and an obvious Hu protégé—alongside the unceremonious early re-
tirement of Li Yuanchao and the quiet demotion of Liu Qibao, two
prominent Tuanpai kingpins, signal with very little ambiguity that Hu
Jintao’s remaining influence within the CCP leadership is token at
best. (19) In short, while the current PB reflects some semblance of bal-
ance, when we parse through the optics, it becomes quite clear that Xi
Jinping has taken full advantage of his position to tip the scales sharply
in his favour. 
Dampening dissent
The relative ease with which Xi Jinping has refashioned and reconstituted
the institutional infrastructure raises questions about the internal proce-
dures underpinning collective leadership; namely that of Inner-Party Democ-
racy (Lin 2002; Hu 2010). The concept, admittedly vague, rests in the belief
that lower levels of power, despite being selected by the top leaders, exercise
some influence over top leaders and decisions through a process referred
to as “reciprocal accountability” (Shirk 1993). Although reciprocal account-
ability has not been directly demonstrated in China, the process by which
the CCOM ratifies PB decisions and appointments is codified in the consti-
tution. (20)
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18. There is no clear-cut way to measure factional alignments. While some look at home town and
schooling experience, others prioritise common work experience. I treat the incumbent leader
during entry into the central committee, widely seen as the inner circle of the CCP, as a key indi-
cator for a possible factional tie. Then, I consider shared working experience and personal con-
nections as confirmation. In the absence of confirmatory links, I do not assign a factional tie. 
19. Both Li and Liu were prominent members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the organisa-
tional base for Hu Jintao’s Tuanpai faction. While Li has gone into early retirement, Liu and Zhang
have been demoted from the PB positions in the 18th Congress to CCOM positions in the 19th,
without much explanation. 
20. Central Committee members have exercised institutional power vis-à-vis PB members in other
communist systems such as the Soviet Union in 1957 and 1964, and by a no-confidence vote in
Vietnam in 2014. 
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Table 2 – 19th Party Congress Politburo 
(Standing Committe Excluded)
Member Age Jiang Hu Xi
CCOM
entry
Hu Chunhua 54 ✔ 2007
Ding Xuexiang 55 ✔ 2017
Chen Min'er 57 ✔ 2012
Li Qiang 58 ✔ 2017
Huang Kunming 61 ✔ 2017
Li Hongzhong 61 – – – 2017
Li Xi 61 ✔ 2017
Cai Qi 62 ✔ 2017
Chen Quanguo 62 ✔ 2012
Guo Shengkun 63 ✔ 2012
Chen Xi 64 ✔ 2012
Yang Xiaodu 64 ✔ 2012
Liu He 65 ✔ 2012
Wang Chen 67 ✔ 2002
Xu Qiliang 67 ✔ 2002
Sun Chunlan 67 ✔ 2007
Yang Jiechi 67 – – – 2007
Zhang Youxia 67 – – – 2007
Note: I treat the incumbent leader during entry into the central committee as a key
indicator for a possible factional tie. Then, I consider shared working experience and
personal connections as confirmatory. In the absence of confirmatory links, I do not
assign a factional tie. Based on records from China Vitae Research Library.
Whereas the 17th and 18th congresses were each preceded by an internal
election, (21) selection in the 19th Congress was conducted by “face-to-face”
consultation, with Xi Jinping personally meeting with 59 senior and retired
leaders to seek their “suggestions.” Other senior leaders also held one-on-
one sessions with 290 ministerial cadres and senior military officers. (22) To
understand what this means procedurally as well as politically, it is worth
briefly digressing for a review of internal polls and consultation.
There are two aspects to internal CCP election procedures that set them
far apart from elections typical in Western democratic contexts. First, they
are secret, so the outcome can never be independently verified. Second,
Chinese internal elections are not contests among competing candidates.
Instead, they operate as straw polls, based on a menu drafted by the PBSC,
from which voters can identify who they would not want to be promoted.
In October 2017, for instance, roughly 8 percent of proposed candidates for
the 19th CCOM were eliminated by negative selection. (23)
This approach departs from positive selection in two important ways. First,
it biases against the rise of popular candidates, a principle that is a mainstay
of collective leadership (Gueorguiev and Schuler 2016). Second, negative
voting allows voters to knock off multiple names at once, which makes it
difficult for voters to coordinate on a preferred candidate. In practice, neg-
ative selection delivers a range of least bad options, thereby empowering
the PBSC to mix and match rather than having to adopt a set meal.
Consultation is a different decision-making process but relies on roughly
the same principles and leans even more sharply in the same top-heavy di-
rection. As in negative voting, its key premise is that decision-makers set
the agenda by defining the proposed list of candidates. Similarly, consulta-
tion also makes it difficult for the input providers to coordinate on preferred
candidates because they are communicating vertically with the senior lead-
ers but not horizontally among themselves. In effect, this provides senior
leaders valuable information without the risk of bottom-up coordination. 
There is a cost, however. Not only does the compartmentalisation of input
undermine the institutional basis of reciprocal accountability, face-to-face
consultation, as opposed to a ballot, is unlikely to yield much in the way of
unfiltered information. This risk increases with the personalisation of power,
as any disagreement with nominees or policy proposals could be interpreted
as disagreement with Xi Jinping himself. In other words, the move towards
consultation, in combination with personalisation, will discourage elites
from revealing preferences and speaking out. This, in turn, will compound
the regime’s information problem, make it harder to anticipate opposition,
and increase the chance of policy mistakes (Stromseth et al. 2017). 
The end of collective leadership?
Does an ever stronger Xi Jinping translate into a weaker CCP? If we
accept the idea that personalisation is antithetical to institutional sur-
vival, then Xi Jinping’s affront on collective leadership represents a sub-
stantial liability for CCP survival. At the same time, the zero-sum
relationship between personalisation and institutionalisation is not wa-
terproof. As Slater (2003) reminds us, highly institutionalised autocracies
practice norms and procedures to constrain personal power, “but they
are neither the sole nor the primary purposes of authoritarian institu-
tions.” Ultimately, the raison d’etre of authoritarian institutions is not
to prevent one-man rule, but to “supply a regime with the ‘infrastruc-
tural power’ necessary to implement its command over potential [op-
ponents]” (Slater 2003: 82). 
Applied to the case of China, there are at least three reasons why Xi’s con-
solidation of power might not have come at the direct expense of the Party.
First, it is important to remember that the seeds of Xi’s unprecedented rise
were sown well in advance of his taking office. Specifically, in reducing the
PBSC from nine to seven members, five of whom would be too old to stay
on past the 19th Congress, CCP elites expressed a preference for centralising
and consolidating power in one leader. Furthermore, Xi’s ability to lead with
a strong hand had everything to do with the fact that Hu Jintao handed
over all key leadership positions in one clean transfer. As Joseph Fewsmith
(2013) put it when commenting on the 18th Congress of 2012: 
Ironically the apparent concentration of power in the hands of those
with strong ties to Jiang Zemin may permit Xi Jinping to emerge as
a significantly stronger leader than Hu Jintao in 2002 and later years,
even as this sort of political game could threaten over time the
norms that have provided political stability in the Party. 
Surely, Xi Jinping has proven far more capable of personal aggrandisement
than his peers may have ever anticipated, but it was a strongman they asked
for.
Second, by the end of Hu Jintao’s second term, elite politics in China had
given way to a not-so-hidden competition between factional camps. Elite
cohesion was so fraught that in the months leading up to the 18th Congress
rumours floated of an armed coup. (24) In September of 2012, Xi Jinping him-
self went missing for more than two weeks, fuelling speculation of a power
struggle. More generally, elites (not to mention average citizens) were
openly bemoaning corruption, pollution, ballooning government debt, and
widespread ideological apathy. In short, the CCP was in the grip of factional
infighting, and at risk of losing its political compass. While many may have
hoped for liberal reforms as the solution, the temptation of a strong leader
proved highly attractive, even if it risked undermining collective leadership.
Third, many of the festering problems from the end of Hu’s tenure have
not been resolved. Today, China’s debt-to-GDP ratio has edged up to any-
where between 260%, according to official statistics, to around 320, based
on independent assessments (Shih 2017). Similarly, SOE and banking sector
reforms, not to mention lofty promises about rule of law, have made disap-
pointingly little progress over the last five years—something Xi Jinping and
his cabinet have acknowledged and promised to double up on, during
speeches at the 2018 annual legislative session. All this comes at a time of
heightened international insecurity and economic exposure for the Chinese
state. The prospect of a third term for Xi Jinping, if anything, promises some
continuity in policy direction and commitments. In short, Xi’s personalisa-
tion of power in China, as was the case with Mahathir in Malaysia, may have
helped rather than undermined the Party’s position. 
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21. Under the original system, senior leaders, including outgoing CCOM and CCDI members, could
nominate and ultimately vote for new CCOM and CCDI members based on a menu of candidates
vetted by the PBSC. In 2012, this procedure was extended to include allowing these voters to
vote on the members of the Politburo Standing Committee as well. See: Wang Xiangwei, “Despite
Retirement, Xi’s Right-Hand Man Wang Qishan is Still Within Arm’s Reach,” op. cit.
22. “How China’s New Central Leadership are Elected,” Xinhua, 26 October 2017, www.xin
huanet.com/english/2017-10/26/c_136707985.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017). 
23. Elimination in previous congresses is reported to have ranged between 5 and 10 percent. See: “At
Least 8 pct of CPC Central Committee Nominees Voted Off,” Xinhua, 23 October 2017, www.we-
bcitation.org/6x9ue2EXG (accessed on 1 November 2017)
24. While it is impossible to independently verify any of the rumours, the 2015 conviction of Zhou
Yongkang, then China’s security chief, for the unprecedented crime of “non-organization political
activities” lends credence to the notion that some form of extra-institutional contest for power
likely occurred just prior to the 18th Congress. 
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The argument here is not that personalisation is fully compatible with in-
stitutionalisation, but that when it comes to non-democratic rule there are
higher priorities. Using Slater’s terminology, facilitating Xi’s consolidation
arguably contributed to the CCP’s infrastructural power at a time when se-
rious fissures were emerging. Whether the bet pays off in the long-term is
an open question; but depicting Xi’s rise as coming fully at the expense of
the CCP is misleading. (25)
As institutional theorists and scholars of comparative politics have long
argued, third-party enforcement is a definitional trait of institutions (Streeck
and Thelen 2005), and in a one-party state there is none. Instead, the bite
of authoritarian comes from the risk of violent power struggle that looms
in the background (Boix and Svolik 2013). Xi’s cautious and tedious ap-
proach to circumventing, rigging, and packing demonstrates that he is mind-
ful of such risks. For example, amending the constitution to abolish term
limits for the presidency, a ceremonial position relative to that of general
secretary, did more to signal Xi’s intentions than to facilitate them. Put sim-
ply, publicly floating and then having the entire legislature vote on rule
change that could easily have been circumvented, and doing so five years
in advance seems like a risky approach to committing what has been de-
scribed as an institutional coup. (26)
Finally, even though Xi’s affront on executive constraint has undoubtedly
eroded the credibility of collective leadership, we should be realistic about
how much has really been lost. The expectation that top leaders resign
after two terms, for instance, has been severely discredited, yet, as dis-
cussed earlier, these norms were never formally adopted. Indeed, norms
on term limits remained very much in question up through 2002. Ironi-
cally, their apparent enforcement in 2012, by vesting full power in Xi Jin-
ping, set the stage for their corrosion. Indeed, if we accept the proposition
that institutions for collective leadership, e.g., age-based retirement and
staggered grooming, are intended to prevent personalisation, we must
also acknowledge that such a system also puts incumbents in the difficult
position of either resigning themselves to lame-duck status or ruthlessly
trying to cannibalise their successor (Herz 1952). (27) Whereas Hu Jintao’s
second term is illustrative of the former, Xi Jinping’s is clearly opting for
the latter. 
The dictator’s shadow
Even if the rise of a strongman was evident as early as 2012, it was not
until March 2018 that the totality of Xi Jinping’s personalisation of power
came into sharp relief. Though it is now abundantly clear that Xi Jinping is
intent on a third term, his ability to stay in office that long is not a foregone
conclusion, nor is it obvious that he plans to stay on indefinitely. Interest-
ingly, on 12 March 2018, shortly after the NPC voted almost unanimously
to abolish term limits, the state press went on the defensive, arguing that
“the decision does not mean the end of the retirement system for Party
and State leaders, nor does it imply lifetime tenure for any leader.” (28)
While we can dismiss the comfort of the propaganda spin, it is worth con-
sidering: what are the circumstances under which leaders refuse to retire?
The simple answer is always. An alternative explanation is that stepping
down is inherently risky, as authoritarian leaders are far more likely to suffer
violent ends than their democratic counterparts (Cox 2009). These risks do
not subside when an incumbent retires. On the contrary, vulnerability in-
creases as they are no longer in any position to protect themselves, or their
friends. In short, there is good reason to suspect that authoritarian leaders
are deterred from stepping down by a lack of security for their lives and
livelihood, and that of their friends and families (Albertus and Menaldo
2012; Debs 2016; Escriba-Folch 2013). (29)
In the presence of an informal retirement age and fixed terms, such fears
are clear and proximate from day one of an incumbent’s tenure. For some-
one like Xi, who has laid ruin to countless “flies” and several “tigers” since
taking office, these worries are compounded every day as new knives are
secretly sharpened for revenge. As Susan Shirk put it, “Xi has a big target on
his back.” (30) Ironically, Xi might have been spared future retribution had he
abided by party precedent and shielded former and current PB members
from his anti-corruption campaign. By going after the likes of Zhou
Yongkang and Sun Zhengcai, Xi has opened the floodgates and raised the
prospect that his own associates, or perhaps even he himself, could one day
be treated the same way.
Seen in this light, Xi Jinping’s eponymous inscription in the CCP constitu-
tion is probably the closest one could get to an iron-clad guarantee for
peaceful retirement. Put simply, from the perspective of late 2017, it would
seem that Xi Jinping is untouchable, even if he steps down. This, ironically,
may be the strongest justification for thinking that Xi might eventually retire
voluntarily.
However, even if Xi has secured his place in the sun, the same is not true
for his family, friends, or policies, each of which will become vulnerable the
moment Xi is no longer in charge. To protect the people and policies he
holds dear, Xi will have to cast a long shadow that extends well beyond his
eventual departure. Seeing the effects of what such a strategy could bring
requires digging deeper into the party pipeline to examine the leadership
cohorts of tomorrow. 
Seeding the pipeline
As discussed earlier, Chinese leadership norms operate by front-loading the
future into the present. For instance, allowing incumbents to groom their
successor’s successor while discouraging them from hand-picking immediate
successors gives incumbents a stake in the perpetuity of the regime without
allowing them to dominate the present or the immediate future (Nathan
2003). By the same token, Xi Jinping’s power grab is just as consequential
for downstream leadership cohorts, irrespective of his own current intentions. 
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25. It is perhaps worth noting that Mahathir, the personalising Malaysian dictator and protagonist of
Slater’s 2003 article, orchestrated a smooth handover to a successor that same year. Members
of the ruling UMNO wept at his announcement, imploring him to stay on. See: John Roberts,
“Malaysian Prime Minister’s Sudden Resignation Points to Political Instability Ahead,” World So-
cialist Web Site, 5 July 2002, www.wsws.org/en/articles/2002/07/mala-j05.html (accessed on 15
March 2018). 
26. While the CCP has a two-thirds majority in the National People’s Congress, it only holds a little
over a third of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference, which also met during the
annual legislative session in March 2018. Even if we are deeply sceptical about the independent
power of China’s legislature, the national focal point of the meeting, combined with the presumed
norms around tenure, means that this event was arguably the best opportunity for Xi’s opponents
to mount a coordinated institutional challenge to his personalisation. 
27. Jiang Zemin did considerable damage to Hu Jintao’s tenure by refusing to be a lame-duck leader
prior to handing over power.
28. See: Zhang Jianfang, “Support for Amendments Belies Naysayers’ Prejudice: China Daily Com-
ment,” China Daily, 12 March 2018, english.cctv.com/2018/03/12/ARTIBnPtQNnsXajsS6wTr0e
5180312.shtml?platform=hootsuite (accessed on 15 March 2018). 
29. Consider the late Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, who voluntary resigned from power in 1982,
only to be tried (in absentia) and sentenced to death in 1984, or the numerous others like him
who live or have died in exile after stepping down from power. 
30. Cited in Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping Unveils China’s New Leaders but No Clear Successor,” The New
York Times, 24 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html
(accessed on 15 November 2017). 
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Some potential downstream effects are visible if we look at the compo-
sition of the enlarged CCOM. (31) Roughly 64% of the members of the 19th
CCOM are newcomers. The comparable proportions from 2012 and 2007
were only 48 and 50%, respectively. Whereas much of the turnover in 2007
was the consequence of retirement, a substantial portion of change in 2017
has been forced through corruption-related ousting. In total, 35 members
(18 full and 17 alternates) from the 18th CCOM were punished for corrup-
tion. Only four members suffered a similar fate during Hu Jintao’s entire
tenure. It is worth noting that each of the 35 members punished over the
last five years was young enough to conceivably stay in office past 2022. (32)
Overall, only two of the 376 members in the 19th CCOM were born in the
1970s. Compare that to 25 members born in the 1960s in the 17th CCOM, a
decade earlier. Similarly, of the 204 19th CCOM members with full voting
rights, only 32 were born after 1960 and therefore eligible to stay on for two
full terms in 2022, compared to 70, a decade earlier. By nearly every metric
available, the current CCOM is the oldest since 1992, when the current lead-
ership institutions were first constituted. As illustrated in Figure 1, the age dis-
tribution of the 19th CCOM is heavily skewed to the left, meaning far fewer
younger cadres—especially among alternate members, who represent the
pipeline for CCP leadership in 2032. Indeed, the “Alternates” panel of Figure 1
suggests there is an entire generation of future leaders missing from the CCOM.
The overall shift towards older cadres is partially offset by a small
bump of “53-year-old and under” members, seen in the “Full” panel of
Figure 1. In terms of continuity, these “bridging” cadres are interesting
insofar as they have voting rights to determine the make-up of the PB
during the 20th Congress in 2022 and are young enough to make it into
the 22nd Congress in 2032. If Xi Jinping were worried about the post-
retirement period, it is precisely this group of cadres that would concern
him, since their influence bridges across not one but two prospective
leadership cohorts.
Overall, there are only 10 “bridging” cadres in the 19th Congress. Although
we still do not know enough about this group to assign them to any par-
ticular camp, we can examine their respective career tracks. Lu Hao, who
also happens to be the youngest of the group, rose rapidly through the ranks,
building experience in both local government and central organisations. Lu
has also been in the CCOM since 2012 and governor of Heilongjiang since
2013. As of this writing, however, Lu has received no further promotions,
signalling a potential stall in his career as a once rising star. (33) By contrast,
Zhang Guoqing was parachuted in to serve as mayor of Chongqing from an
industry position, with no other political or administrative experience to
speak of.
The same distinction between stalled risers and powerful newcomers
broadly applies to the rest of the bridging candidates, with veteran tech-
nocrats such as Li Ganjie, Ni Yuefeng, and Huang Shouhong finding them-
selves in roughly the same career grades they occupied a decade ago. By
contrast, Liu Zhenli, Wu Zhenglong, Chen Jining, Jin Zhuanglong, and Meng
Xiangfeng have all made swift entries into top leadership positions without
the thick resumes that typically prop up the weighty portfolios they now
hold. While it would be premature to say this latter set of bridging cadres
are in Xi’s faction, they very likely owe their recent political fortunes to his
patronage.
The advanced overall age of the 19th CCOM warrants a closer look at
younger members. The two youngest—both in the alternates pool—are 43-
year-old Cai Songtao and 47-year-old Zhou Qi. Cai heads the party com-
mittee of impoverished Lankao County in Henan, while Zhou is a prominent
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31. The enlarged CCOM includes full and alternate members. 
32. Four members—Wang Sanyun, Wu Aiying, Wang Min, Tian Xiusi—would have to have gotten pro-
moted to the PB in order to stay on. 
33. Moreover, Lu’s background as CCYL leader and Hu Jintao protégé are unlikely to win him any
favours within Xi Jinping’s growing network. 
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stem cell biologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Both promotions
highlight some of Xi’s top policy priorities for the next five years. (34)
The scarcity of younger cadres within the CCOM implies that future lead-
ership positions may be sourced from outside the traditional pipeline. We
already have several examples. Beijing’s new mayor, Chen Jining, is an envi-
ronmental scientist who rose to prominence primarily within academic cir-
cles, with only a brief two-year stint as Minister of Environmental Protection
(2015-2017). Similarly, both Zhang Guoqing, the new mayor of Chongqing,
and Jin Zhuanglong, deputy director of Civil-Military Integration, come
straight from the military-aerospace industry. Again, these promotions not
only mean more handpicked loyalists in important leadership positions, they
also reinforce key themes in Xi’s policy rhetoric. For instance, Chen Jining’s
placement in Beijing—notorious for its air pollution—is unlikely to have
been a coincidence. (35) Similarly, technology investment, particularly in
aerospace, is a key pillar in Xi’s military modernisation strategy. (36)
More generally, the absence of young faces in the CCOM is disconcerting
for the overall health of the CCP. First, it implies a dearth of eligible talent
for filling future leadership positions. Second, it suggests we should expect
more one-term leaders, who serve only five years in a top leadership posi-
tion before retiring. This would shorten the political cycle and infuse more
uncertainty into long-term policymaking. Furthermore, a dearth of younger
officials means that even if talent were to be found, promotions would have
to be fast-tracked through the system—implying thinner resumes and per-
haps less appreciation for party etiquette in the top levels of leadership to
come.
Discussion
Elite politics under the Xi Jinping administration has been anything but
dull. Former and rising leaders within the Party have been convicted of cor-
ruption and the top echelons of power have been thoroughly reconstituted,
all while Xi Jinping has doubled his portfolio, enshrined his name in the CCP
charter, expanded his anti-corruption campaign to the state and public sec-
tor, and abolished any legal impediments to holding on to power indefi-
nitely. How did Xi Jinping amass such unprecedented levels of personal
power? What does this tell us about the future of the CCP under Xi Jinping
and beyond? Is collective leadership dead, as some have suggested? Are we
in store for a relapse into the strongman politics of the Mao era? 
In this review, I have argued that Xi Jinping’s rise was facilitated by CCP
elites, who in 2012 invested full authority into Xi’s office, even before he
entered it. As in the case of Mahathir in Malaysia, we cannot ignore the
possibility that Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power has helped stabilise a
fractured party, at least for the short term. Further, I have shown that the
inherent malleability of Chinese leadership norms and institutions has al-
lowed Xi Jinping to expand his influence and promote his loyalists without
overtly violating them. Indeed, the painstaking manner by which Xi Jinping
has gone about securing his position and policy priorities arguably says less
about his hunger for power than it does about his concern about upsetting
the semblance of institutional legitimacy.
Remember, ambiguous succession norms meant that Xi could have held
on to power without amending the constitution, and he could have kept
Wang Qishan without retiring him from the PBSC only to promote him to
the vice-presidency three months later. Similarly, Xi’s anti-corruption agents
within the CCDI could have imposed their control over procuratorates rel-
atively easily, given overlapping leadership roles. Instead, Xi initiated a com-
plex institutionalisation process for the NSC and subordinated provincial
commissions, (37) backed by a new National Supervision Law that even went
through 30 days of public notice and comment. (38) Curiously enough, it is
believed that this institutionalisation effort, not a grand scheme, set off the
constitutional revision process that opened the door to the removal of term
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34. In 2014, Xi personally adopted Lankao as a pet project for poverty alleviation (Stromseth et al.
2017: 21). More recently, Xi inaugurated an ambitious campaign to wipe out poverty by 2020,
see: Xu Lei, “Xi Urges Stepped-up Efforts to Eradicate Poverty by 2020,” China Daily, 23 February
2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-02/23/content_28310971.htm (accessed on 15
November 2017). In 2016, Xi identified research as one of the core national weakness, urging
more innovation in the physical and biological sciences. See: “The Future of Chinese Research.”
Nature 534(7608): 435–435, 22 June 2016, www.nature.com/news/the-future-of-chinese-re-
search-1.20123 (accessed on 15 November 2017). 
35. It is worth noting that the air quality in Beijing has improved remarkably since November 2017,
in large part thanks to the banning of coal burning in the city and surrounding provinces. 
36. For a summary and links to the speech, see “7 Things You Need to Know About Xi Jinping’s Vision
of a ‘New Era’ for China,” South China Morning Post, 18 October 2017, www.scmp.com/news/
china/policies-politics/article/2115858/key-points-xis-speech-chinas-communist-party-congress
(accessed on 15 November 2017). Relatedly, Shih (2017) identifies an entire cohort of aerospace
engineers taking on high-profile leadership positions across China, including the governorship of
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hunan, and the party secretary’s office in Heilongjiang.
37. “China to Set Up National Supervision Commission Next Year,” Xinhua, 30 October 2017,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/30/c_136713601.htm (accessed on 15 November 2017).
38. Charles Buckley, “In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency Will Be Above the Law,” The
New York Times, 29 November 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jin-
ping-anticorruption.html (accessed on 15 December 2017).
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Table 3 – Bridging Candidates
CCOM Member Age Office Patron Background Rising
Lu Hao 50 Governor, Heilongjiang Province Hu Localities –
Liu Zhenli 53 Lt. Gen. of the PLA Xi Military Y
Li Ganjie 53 Minister of Environmental Protection N/A Environment –
Wu Zhenglong 53 Governor, Jiangsu Province Xi Localities Y
Zhang Guoqing 53 Mayor, Chongqing Municipal Committee Xi Aerospace Y
Chen Jining 53 Mayor, Beijing Municipality Xi Environment Y
Jin Zhuanglong 53 Dep. Director Civil-Military Integration Comm. Xi Aerospace Y
Meng Xiangfeng 53 Dep. Director of General Office of the CCOM. Xi Discipline Y
Ni Yuefeng 53 General Administration of Customs N/A Discipline –
Huang Shouhong 53 Director, State Council Research Office N/A Management –
Note: I define "bridging candidates" as those who are young enough to enjoy the unique privilege of both influencing the make-up of the next congress in 2022 as well as making
it into the 22nd Congress of 2032. A member is considered "rising" if he or she is consecutively promoted into new portfolios. Based on records from China Vitae Research Library.
limits. (39) In short, it appears that Xi Jinping is both circumventing existing
institutions and cautiously setting up a base, albeit a flimsy one, for new
institutions to follow. 
To be clear, none of this is a silver lining for the future of democracy in
China, but it does suggest that one-party rule has not been replaced by
one-man rule. Indeed, Xi’s achievements in consolidating power are just as
consequential for his willingness to one day retire as they are for his ability
to remain in office indefinitely. Put differently, every incumbent leader re-
quires some assurance that neither family, friends, nor legacies will become
a target for retribution once he or she leaves office. This is especially true in
regimes operating under weak rule of law and for incumbents who have
made enemies during their tenure—both of which apply to China and Xi
to the utmost degree. In this light, getting one’s name inscribed in the
preamble of the party constitution is both a signal of supreme power and
an insurance policy for peaceful retirement. 
Even though we cannot predict Xi’s intentions, we can observe the more
subtle but systemic impact his power consolidation efforts have had on the
Chinese political and administrative system. The impact is broad but con-
centrated in three areas. First, traditional divisions of power are being
blurred, with party and state functions becoming increasingly indistinguish-
able. Second, with regards to leadership selection and elite decision-making,
we are seeing a departure from intra-party democracy in favour of more
top-heavy modes of consultation. The third concerns future cohorts of
power, where bottlenecks in the leadership pipeline reveal potential short-
ages in qualified contenders for future transitions. While these changes do
not directly impinge on party norms, they pose challenges to the institu-
tional structure of the party-state and its ability to govern. 
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